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1. Introduction 
Spain is often thought of as an economy with highly regulated labour markets, and most 
aggregate indices of flexibility tend to rank the country at the bottom of the list of aEeD 
economies. Spanish unemployment, hitting over 20% of the labour force, reinforced this 
belief among both experts and employers. This situation has probably triggered the im-
plementation of the experiment of "flexibility at the margin", started in 1984 with the 
introduction of a new typology of labour contract - namely "fixed-term" or "temporary" 
contracts1 - characterised by limited duration and negligible firing costs. These contracts 
have been massively used: since their introduction, 98% of newly registered contracts have 
been of this type2 . Within a decade, the Spanish labour market had experienced record 
rates of gross job creation, but had gradually evolved towards a dual structure (see Segura 
et al., 1991, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994), with two thirds of employees retaining a perma-
nent status and the rest \vorking in a highly mobile market. Interestingly enough, the use 
of fixed-term contracts was not linked to the creation of more seasonal jobs, as shown in 
Figure 1. Indeed, these contracts have been used for all types of jobs and occupations, and 
their higher share in total employment should be mainly attributed to their widespread 
application in non-seasonal jobs. At the same time, the unemployment rate stayed well 
above 20%. 
Various critiques to the 1984 reform have addressed issues such as the adverse effects 
of fi...xed-term contracts on wage formation (Bentolila and Dolado, 1992, and Jimeno and 
Toharia, 1993), productivity (Jimeno and Toharia, 1992) and absenteeism (Jimeno and 
Toharia, 1996). 
Here we propose to investigate whether the limited success of higher flexibility at the 
margin is linked to a growing labour market segmentation, with nearly 35% of workers 
reshuffling themselves among a given number of temporary jobs. If this is the case, policies 
aimed at improving labour market flexibility in Spain as well in the rest of Europe and, 
1 These two terms will be used interchangeably. 
~See Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). 
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more generally, at facing the European unemployment problem, should be targeted at the 
core rather than at the fringe of labour contracts. This also seems to be the view of Spanish 
policy makers, that more recently tried to limit the applicability of fixed-term contracts 
(1994 reform) and created a new type of permanent contract with lower firing costs (1997 
reform). 
o seasonal te 
o non seasonal te 
.35713 
.024333 
87 88 89 90 91 
t. total te 
I 
92 93 94 95 96 97 
year 
The share of temporary contracts in total employment, 1987-1997. 
More specifically, \ve study the duration pattern of fi..xed-term contracts using micro 
data drawn from the panel version of Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA enlazada). This 
should shed some light on the kind of use that employers make of this instrument. In 
principle, fixed-term contracts can be adopted because the nature of the underlying job 
is seasonal; but they can also be used as a probation period that can lead to permanent 
employment; or - finally - as a cheaper/more flexible option for adjusting employment. 
Leaving out the first option3 , we can in principle discriminate between the other two 
by analysing the time pattern of the rate at which firms convert fixed-term into permanent 
3 Figure 1 shown in fact that the use of fixed-term contracts for seasonal jobs has been relatively limited. 
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contracts within the (legal) maximum spell of 3 years since their start. This reveals whether 
firms opt for permanent employment only when there is no other way to retain the worker 
(i.e. after 3 years of temporary employment), or \vhether temporary employment is used 
as a genuine probation period that may end up in permanent employment at any time 
during the 3 years. 
Existing contributions on renewal rates (see Toharia, 1996, and Alba-Ramirez, 1997) 
generally use logit models to analyse the determinants of the probability of receiving a per-
manent contract, conditional on being initially hired on a temporary basis. Such models 
may prove rather inflexible \vhen applied to the analysis of the dynamic path of transition 
rates. The technique that we use for this task is a duration model for temporary employ-
ment, with competing risks of flowing into permanent employment versus non-employment 
or self-employment, and sufficiently flexible duration dependence for the exit into perma-
nent employment. This highlights the behaviour of the hazard during the whole duration 
of temporary employment. 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is both methodological and 
related to the use of the EPA data base. \Ve believe that the use of duration models 
best describes the dynamics of the transition process bet\veen temporary and permanent 
employment. Such models in fact exploit the potential strength of a cohort panel study, 
\vhich is the possibility of being able to track individuals over time and observe exactly 
how long they take to make an employment change. Moreover, the use of individual 
information on \vorkers' human capital that can be obtained from the EPA shows whether 
the prospect of permanent employment is shared among temporary workers, and to what 
extent there are some categories that are more likely than others to remain trapped in 
temporary jobs. 
The existing literature has not put both these things together. Alba (1997) has esti-
mated a multinomiallogit model for the probability of obtaining a permanent conversion 
versus that of retaining the temporary status and that of terminating the temporary em-
ployment spell with non-employment. Garcia-Fontes and Hopenhayn (1996) estimate a 
duration model of job tenure using the Social Security records. These data avoid the use 
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of self-reported information on the duration of contracts, and therefore have the advantage 
of reducing measurement error, but on the other hand they provide very little information 
on workers' characteristics, and do not allow to identify the temporary/permanent nature 
of the contract held. 
The paper maps out as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant characteristics of the 
Spanish legislation on temporary employment. Section 3 provides a discrete time duration 
model, that applies to the transition of workers out of temporary employment. Section 4 
describes the data that we use, extracted from the panel version of the EPA. Section 5 
presents our results. Section 6 finally concludes. 
2. The institutional background 
Current legislation regarding labour contracts is contained in the Worker's Statute (Ley 
del Estatuto de los Trabajadores, LET) of 1980 and its posterior reforms of 1984, 1994 
and 1997. The LET of 1980 gave priority to contracts of indefinite duration (permanent 
contracts). It also allowed employers to use fixed-term contracts either for jobs that were 
temporary in their nature (e.g. particular projects, like those in the construction sector, 
or seasonal jobs, like those in the tourism sector) or under particular situations. These 
situations include eventual increases of demand, replacement of a permanent worker in case 
of absence, or temporary suspension of a permanent contract. The LET also established 
the possibility for the Government to use fixed-term contracts as an incentive to promote 
employment. 
The 1984 reform exploits this last possibility in an extreme way4. It introduces some 
degree of flexibility by extending the applicability of fixed-term contracts. After this reform, 
any unemployed worker can be hired on a temporary basis without the requirement of a 
specific cause. This means that for any job, employers can either choose a permanent or a 
4Previous uses of fixed-term contracts to promote employment in 1981 and 1982 were very restricted 
to certain types of workers (youth and long term unemployed), and firms could only hire a certain number 
of workers on fixed-term contracts according to their size. 
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fixed-term contract to hire a worker. 
There are t\VO main types of non-causal fixed-term contracts: a general one (contmtos 
tempomles de fomento del empleo) and a specific one for youths. In this last category, it is 
possible to distinguish among training contracts ( contmtos en pnicticas) and apprenticeship 
contracts (contmtos pam la formaci6n). 
Fixed-term contracts can be characterised according to: i) the required conditions for 
workers and employers to sign these contracts, ii) the limits on their duration and iii) the 
indemnities at their termination. 
(i) The required conditions for \yorkers and employers to sign fixed-term contracts 
Any worker can be hired, by one or several different employers, with a general fixed-term 
contract for a maximum total period of 3 years. If a worker has already been employed 
on a fixed-term contract for this period of time, he/she has to wait 12 months in order 
to be able to sign a new fi..xed-term contract. Similarly, firms face this 3 years limit for 
any given vacancy. That is, firms cannot fill the same vacancy for more than 3 years with 
one (or several) temporary worker(s). Also, firms cannot use temporary contracts to hire 
\yorkers if they have reduced their workforce for economic reasons or with dismissals that 
have been declared "unfair" in the last 12 months5 • 
The above principle also applies to fixed-term contracts for youths. Moreover, for 
training employment contracts, workers are required to have a qualification of at least 
secondary school level. This qualification must have been obtained within the 4 years 
previous to the signing of the contract. Apprenticeship contracts are designed for people 
between 16 and 20 years old that do not have the education level required in the former 
contract. 
(ii) Limits on their duration 
Since 1992, general fixed-term contracts can be signed for a minimum of 6 months, and 
fixed-term contracts for youths for a minimum of 3 months. All of them have a maximum 
5In practice, it is difficult to know if these rules have been effectively enforced. 
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duration of 3 years. Again, contracts cannot be rene\ved at the end of this maximum length 
period by a new fixed-term contract to do the same job. In addition, it is not possible to 
transfer the \vorker to a different job within the firm without signing a permanent contract. 
Upon expiry of the contract, the firm can choose to retain the worker by offering him/her 
a regular contract of undetermined duration, or the job-worker pair has to be split and the 
position is destroyed. 
(iii) Indemnities at their termination 
In order to assess the change that fixed-term contracts imply in this domain, the regu-
lation of dismissals of permanent contracts is described in the first place. 
It is possible to distinguish three different types of dismissals within the LET. First, 
disciplinary dismissals, in which the worker is fired without any right to indemnities. Sec-
ond, objective dismissals for legally authorised reasons such as lack of adjustment of the 
\vorker to the job due to technological changes or recurrent justified absence from \vork. In 
these cases, the worker has the right to a severance payment of 20 days' wage per year of 
seniority, \vith a maximum of one year's wage. Last, economic dismissals, that generally 
refer to collective layoffs for unfavourable economic trends. Such dismissals need to be dis-
cussed bet\veen the employer and the workers' representatives first and then they have to 
be approved by the labour authority. The same indemnities as in the objective dismissals 
apply in these cases. 
The worker always has the right to sue the employer if he/she disagrees with the 
dismissal case. Once the case is taken to court, it can be declared "fair" or "unfair". In 
the first case, the \vorker is fired with the right to the regular indemnity (20 days' wage 
per year \vorked). In the second case, the worker has the right to indemnities of 45 days' 
wages per year worked with a maximum of 42 months. 
The importance of employment protection legislation in Spain comes from the fact that, 
in practice, the majority of dismissals end up costing the indemnity of 45 days' wages per 
year worked6 • \Vhile the indemnities for :'fair" dismissals are within the European average, 
6See IVlalo Ocaiia (1998) for a detailed discussion. 
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the ones for "unfair" cases are one of the highest within the European Union (see Bentolila, 
1996). 
The 1984 reform leaves the legal situation of permanent workers basically unaffected, 
but it makes the hiring of workers on a temporary basis substantially easier. Upon ex-
piration of a fixed-term contract, employers have to pay an indemnity of 12 days' wages 
per year worked in the case of general fixed-term contracts, while no severance payment is 
imposed upon expiration of training or apprenticeship contracts. Also, a fixed-term worker 
has never the right to sue the employer for "unfair" dismissal. 
This situation was changed in 1994, when specific limits were introduced on the use of 
fixed-term contracts. The application of general fixed-term contracts was restricted to some 
categories of workers (over 45 years of age, disabled, or long term unemployed). But at the 
same time, firing costs on all existing fixed-term contracts were reduced. Also) subsidies 
and incentives to promote fixed-term contracts for youths were cut. They were replaced 
by others that \vould promote the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent ones. 
Finally, the 1997 reform recognised somehow the problem of growing segmentation 
III the Spanish labour market. A new typology of permanent contract was introduced 
targeted to groups \vith greater employability difficulties such as people less than 30 years 
old, people above 45 years old, long term unemployed, handicapped people or \vomen in 
overrepresented professions. This new permanent contract carried lower firing costs than 
the existing ones for "unfair" dismissals. 
Our sample period covers the years 1987-1994, so that we expect to cover the period 
characterised by the maximum level of flexibility in hiring procedures, before the effects of 
the 1994 and 1997 reform could produce their effects. Further research is bound to come, 
to assess whether these reforms have significantly affected the insertion of workers into 
permanent employment. 
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3. Econometric specification 
Our analysis requires a discrete time hazard function approach, as outlined in Naren-
dranathan and Stewart (1990). 
Suppose that the transition out of temporary employment is a continuous process with 
hazard 
Bi(t) = A(t) exp (Xi (t)' (3) , (3.1) 
where A(t) denotes the baseline hazard, X (t) is a vector of time-varying explanatory vari-
ables, and (3 is a vector of unknown coefficients. The discrete time hazard denotes the 
probability of a spell of temporary employment being completed by time t + 1, given that 
it was still continuing at time t. Therefore it is given by 
{ I t+l } hi (t) = 1 - exp - t Bi(U)du = 
1 - exp {- exp (Xi (t)' (3 + I (t))} (3.2) 
if we assume that changes in Xi (t) only happen at discrete intervals t, t + 1, t + 2, etc., 
\vhere 
(3.3) 
denotes the integrated hazard. 
The (log) likelihood contribution of a spell of length di is 
Li = Ci (In hi (di) + ~ In {I - hi (t))) + (I - e;) ~\n {I - hi (t)) 
d;-l 
- cdn hi (d i ) + L In {I - hi (t)} 
t=l 
- Ci In (1 - exp [- exp { Xi (dd (3 + I (di ) } ]) 
di-l 
- L exp {Xi (t)' (3 + I (t)} , 
t=l 
(3.4) 
where Ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if d i is uncensored and zero otherwise. 
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vVe assumed so far that we observe entrants into temporary employment. Assume 
instead from now on that we also observe spells of temporary employment that started 
before the survey period, and that we can use self-reported information to find out the 
quarter in which these spells begun. In order to avoid a stock sample bias, we need to 
condition on the length of temporary employment at the first interview date. Suppose that 
an individual i enters the survey after ji quarters of temporary employment and keeps the 
fixed-term contract for another ki quarters, for a total duration di = ji + ki, that can be 
either censored or uncensored. The individual likelihood contribution is therefore 
Li - Ci [lnhdji + ki ) + jiI:-1ln {I - hi(t)} - tin {I - hi(t)}] 
t=l t=l 
+(1- e;) [j;~-l In {I - h,(tn - ~ In {I - h,(tn 1 
fi+ki- 1 
- Ci In hi (j i + ki ) + L In {I - hd t )} 
t=ji+1 
ji+ki- 1 
- L exp{xi(t)',6+i(t)}. (3.5) 
t=jt+ 1 
The model outlined specifies the likelihood of a single risk: that of terminating fixed-
term employment. As we will see below, fixed-term contracts can terminate \vith the 
conversion into a permanent one or alternative states. Given that we are clearly interested 
in the first type of transition, \ve need to estimate a competing risk model, that distinguishes 
exit into employment from exit into alternative states. It can be illustrated that the 
parameters of a given cause-specific hazard can be estimated by treating durations finishing 
for other reasons as censored at time of exit (see Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993). We 
therefore treat all temporary employment spells that end in a new fixed-term contract or 
in non-employment as censored at the time the first contract is terminated. Having said 
this, the semi-parametric hazard specification (3.5) used for the single-risk model can be 
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applied for the permanent job hazard. 
In what follows, the effect of possibly omitted regressors in the exit from fixed-term 
employment is controlled for by conditioning the hazard rate on an individual's unobserved 
characteristics, summarized into the variable v. The conditional (continuous time) hazard 
rate is then written as ()i(t) = ).(t) exp (Xi (t)' f3 + Vi), with Vi independent of Xi(t) and t. 
This specification therefore identifies the three sources of variation among individual hazard 
rates: the duration of fixed-term contract (t), the observable differences among individuals 
(x(t)) and the unobservable ones (v). However, in a competing risk framework, allowing 
a random disturbance term in each of the cause-specific hazard requires an additional 
assumption, that imposes the independence of these disturbance terms across the cause-
specific hazards. 7 
The unconditional hazard (that depends on observable regressors only) is obtained by 
integrating the conditional one over v, under the assumption that V is distributed as a 
Gamma variate of unit mean and variance (J2. Under these assumptions the likelihood is 
given by 
Li - In [(1 + (J2 fiY:-l exp {Xi (t)' f3 + r (t)}) -1/a2 
t=Ji+l 
-C; (1+ 0-2 t~~' exp {x; (t)' f3 + 'Y (t)} ) -l/U'] . (3.6) 
The baseline hazard can be estimated non-parametrically by maximising the log-likelihood 
L = L~l Li \vith respect to the r (t) terms, the vector f3 and the variance term (J2. The 
vector of controls Xi (t) includes a number of individual and job-related characteristics, that 
are treated as time invariant, and are measured at the start of the fixed-term contract (or 
at the time of the first interview if the contract has already started). In order to control 
7The alternative approach would be to assume perfect correlation (as opposed to zero correlation) 
between the cause-specific disturbance terms (see Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993, for a discussion of 
advantages and disadvantages of the two methods). 
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for the effect of local labour market conditions on the conversion probability, Xi (t) also 
includes the unemployment rate of the province where the individual lives. This is treated 
as time-varying, and consists of the quarterly series of local unemployment rates during 
the temporary employment spell. 
4. The data 
The data used in this paper is drawn from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, EnC'uesta de 
Poblacion Activa) which is carried out every quarter on a sample of some 60,000 households. 
It is designed to be representative of the total Spanish population, and contains very 
detailed information about labour force status of individuals. Each household can remain 
in the survey for a maximum of six consecutive quarters: each quarter a new cohort is 
selected, and one si.xth of households leave the sample. Labour force transitions can be 
analysed by using the panel structure of the survey (EPA enlazada) , available for all cohorts 
that entered the survey since 1987. 
Our sample includes individuals belonging to si.x non-overlapping cohorts that entered 
the survey in 1987:2, 1988:4, 1990:2, 1991:4, 1993:2, and 1994:4, respectively, and completed 
six quarterly interviews. Interestingly, this sample period covers a full cycle of the Spanish 
economy. Given that we are modelling transitions out of temporary employment, we select 
all workers that reported having a fixed-term contract in any of the six interviews, selecting 
a final sample of 18,151 individuals. More specifically, we concentrate on the transition 
out of the first fixed-term contract that is observed during the survey period. 
The duration of the contract is constructed using self-reported information from the 
various quarterly intervie\vs. Given that a no contract identifier is supplied, in order to 
follow each single fixed-term contract across interviews \ve rely on information concerning 
(i) the type of contract held; and (ii) the uncompleted duration of the present contract. 
The type of contract held can be permanent or fixed-term. Fixed term contracts are further 
disaggregated into apprenticeships, seasonal jobs, and other. The uncompleted duration of 
the present contract is expected to rise across interviews with calendar time, and to drop 
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to zero whenever there is a contract switch. We therefore consider a spell of temporary 
employment as completed when either there is a change in the type of contract or there is 
a drop in the uncompleted duration of the present contract. 
Roughly 65% of temporary employment spells that we observe started during the survey 
period. The remaining 35% started before the worker was selected for the survey, so that 
we need to condition on the length of temporary employment at the first interview date, 
using once more the information on the uncompleted duration of the current contract 
that is reported at the first interview. The self-reported uncompleted duration up to the 
intervie\v date is measured in months if it is lower than one year, and in years if it if 
longer. Such data bunching problem could be eliminated by focusing only on entrants 
into permanent employment, that do not have any rounded measure of elapsed duration 
attached. However, this would only allow us to observe the time pattern of the renewal 
probability for at most six quarters of duration, and would leave us without any information 
on the behaviour of the hazard towards the legal duration limit of fixed-term contracts. 
Each spell of temporary employment can terminate with a new fixed-term contract, a 
permanent contract, joblessness, or it can be censored if the worker is last observed holding 
the fixed-term contract at the sixth interview. The proportion of fixed-term contracts that 
terminated with a conversion into a permanent one was 20% in 1987 and has declined 
monotonically until 1994 (8.22%), experiencing a very weak recovery thereafter. These 
proportions look slightly lower than those computed in Toharia (1996, Table 4), although 
they follow exactly the same trend. It is worth noticing however that the renewal rates 
computed here refer to the proportion of workers that hold a fixed-term contract at some 
point in time and hold instead a permanent contract in the next interview, i.e. direct 
transitions from temporary to permanent employment. Toharia (1996) computes instead 
the proportion of permanent workers that held a fixed-term contract one year back. We 
prefer to look at direct switches between two subsequent interviews because the yearly 
renewal rates may conceal additional labour market transitions. 
Given that we cannot use an employer identifier, we are not sure that those new per-
manent contracts are renewals of previous fixed-term contracts with same employer, rather 
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than newly-created jobs elsewhere in the economy. However, the fact that between 1986 
and 1992 almost all (98%) new contracts registered at employment offices have been fixed-
term would suggest that the vast majority of permanent contracts that we observe in the 
survey are created through renewals of fixed-term ones. 
Our evidence shows that one third of all fixed-term contracts terminate with a new 
temporary employment spell, one third terminates into unemployment or inactivity, and 
only 11% are renewed on a permanent basis. Given that the survey period is relatively 
short, we do not observe the completion of the remaining 20% of all fixed-term contracts. 
Explanatory variables included in our regressions are personal and family characteristics 
of individual such as gender, education, potential labour market experience8 , marital status 
and number of dependent children. The effect of job-related variables is also considered. 
These include a on-the-job training dummy, a dummy that indicates whether the reason 
for being on a fixed-term contract is the impossibility to find a permanent one, a job search 
dummy that indicates whether the worker is currently looking for another job, and a set 
of industry dummies. A further variable represents the seasonal nature of the fixed-term 
contract held, in order to represent the fact that labour relations that are seasonal or 
any\vay connected to a specific project supposedly tend to offer lower renewal prospects 
than others. Cohort dummies are also included in order to capture any time pattern in 
renewal probabilities across the Spanish business cycle. Finally, the local unemployment 
rate (measured in the province ,vhere the individual works) should capture the effect of 
local labour market performance (if any) on the renewal of contracts. Lower unemployment 
can be thought of increasing renewal probabilities if firms perceive higher labour market 
tightness as lower chances of finding a suitable worker in the unemployment pooL 
Average sample values of these variables are reported in Table 4.1, distinguishing among 
alternative destinations of temporary employment. 
8Computed as age - years of schooling - 6. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
% perm contract temp contract jobless censored % in whole sam 
female 38.78 34.57 41.58 39.86 38.44 
married 43.71 38.11 41.20 38.17 39.92 
pot exp<5yrs 26.68 32.94 32.05 35.17 32.23 
pot expo 5-lOyrs 22.03 22.05 17.64 17.77 19.7 
pot expo 1O-20yrs 22.45 19.97 18.75 19.27 19.72 
pot expo 20-30yrs 13.55 11.92 12.37 12.66 12.45 
pot expo 30+yrs 15.30 13.11 19.18 15.12 15.91 
no qualification 8.49 7.82 14.24 8.08 10.12 
primary education 31.83 28.10 30.96 28.72 29.64 
secondary education 49.60 56.28 48.68 53.56 52.35 
university education 10.07 7.80 6.11 9.63 7.89 
in education/training 5.65 6.99 8.36 8.09 7.48 
perm. contract not found 87.15 89.80 87.93 87.88 88.44 
searching on the job 5.87 6.55 11.77 7.91 8.41 
agriculture 6.34 8.27 19.16 6.88 11.35 
man ufact uring 32.72 32.87 25.73 29.93 29.89 
construction 17.84 19.25 19.09 20.51 19.25 
trade 14.92 19.20 14.56 16.61 16.64 
banking & finance 11.80 8.93 8.45 9.99 9.31 
public & other 16.39 11.48 13.01 16.08 13.57 
duration (quarters) 3.48 3.76 2.46 3.58 3.35 
No. obs. 2012 6083 6192 3864 18151 
Notes. PC: transition to permanent contracts; TC: transition to new fixed-term contract. 
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5. Empirical results 
We are now in a position to estimate the econometric model outlined in section 5, for the 
determinants of the renewal hazard. The results of our estimates are reported in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2. Two specifications of our regression equation are provided. In the first, \ve 
do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. In the second we control for 
the effect of possibly omitted regressors by allowing for a Gamma-distributed disturbance 
term. 
The effect of several individual characteristics on renewal probabilities are fairly stan-
dard, and consistent \vith previous results obtained from logit estimates (see Alba, 1997). 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.1 shO\v that the probability of contract renewal on a 
permanent basis is higher for males than females. This is probably explained by the fact 
that women tend to have weaker labour market attachment than men, and higher turnover, 
so that female employment may be perceived as relatively more risky from employers' point 
of vie\v. In this perspective, the 1997 reform can be interpreted as an attempt to protect 
precisely the permanent employment prospects of categories of \'mrkers with high turnover. 
The ne\v typology of permanent contract introduced \vith the reform is (also) addressed at 
\vomen re-entering the labour force after a period of inactivity. 
It can also be noted that the probability of a permanent renewals increase monotonically 
with education, but it is not greatly affected by potential experience once workers have 
reached at least 5 years of potential labour market attachment. Those who could not find 
a permanent job in the first place have lower renewal probabilities on the current job. 
This sort of correlation between past and current labour market performance is probably 
an effect of unobserved ability levels, that are not captured by standard human capital 
indicators included in the regression. Also those that are already searching for another 
job have lower renewal prospects. In this case we can plausibly detect a reverse causality 
between the two facts: once the worker realises that his/her renewal probabilities are 
fairly low with the current employer, he/she starts searching elsewhere. Receiving on 
the job training very marginally affects renewal probabilities. This is a signal that such 
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training programmes are generally of low quality and anyway do not represent a significant 
long-term investment of firms in human capital of temporary workers. An alternative 
explanation is that also in this case a reverse causality problem can be detected: firms 
know ex-ante that renewal prospects are low and therefore decide not to invest too much 
on a temporary factor of production. Contrary to expectations, workers holding a fixed-
term contract that is fixed-term for intrinsic reasons such as seasonality of the activity 
have higher renewal probabilities. 
Sectoral dummies show that renewal probabilities are highest in the public sector and 
in finance, and lowest in construction and agriculture. Cohort dummies in turn represent a 
time fixed-effect, and show a roughly monotonically decreasing trend in the proportion of 
fixed-term contracts that are renewed on a permanent basis. In order words, this downward 
tendency does not really seem to be at all affected by the business cycle. Furthermore, the 
effect of the 1994 reform on renewal rates might be detected, if any, in the time fixed-effect 
for the last cohort considered, whose transition into permanent employment could happen 
throughout 1995 and at the beginning of 1996. However our results show that the reform 
could not alter the decreasing trend in renewals. Finally, the marginal positive effect of 
local unemployment on renewal rates seems to suggest that low renewal rates cannot be 
blamed on the fact that very high unemployment was actually providing employers \vith 
abundant outside options of covering the position. 
The parallel estimation with unobserved heterogeneity is reported in columns of Table 
5.1 report the estimates. The positive and significant variance of the Gamma-distributed 
disturbance shows that there is some residual heterogeneity among individuals, which is 
not properly accounted for by included regressors. However, the partial effect of most 
regressors remains practically unchanged if compared with the case where no unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for. 
The steps of the baseline hazard are reported in Table 5.2. Looking at the first two 
columns of the table, we notice that the hazard is significantly higher for duration of 7 and 
11 quarters than for all others. In other words, at 2 and 3 years, the probability of renewal 
is highest. In particular, the spike seems more pronounced for three years of duration, 
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Table 5.l: Maximum likelihood estimates of the transition from fixed-term into permanent 
employment 
no heterogeneity heterogeneity 
female -0.101 (0.051) -0.111 (0.060) 
primary education 0.260 (0.096) 0.319 (0.110) 
secondary education 0.322 (0.108) 0.381 (0.124) 
college education 0.544 (0.128) 0.619 (0.150) 
pot. exp 5-lOyrs 0.151 (0.067) 0.152 (0.077) 
pot. exp 10-20 yrs 0.281 (0.076) 0.311 (0.089) 
pot. exp 20-30yrs 0.398 (0.095) 0.440 (0.112) 
pot. exp 30+yrs 0.289 (0.103) 0.333 (0.119) 
married 0.075 (0.062) 0.081 (0.072) 
number of kids 0.038 (0.024) 0.040 (0.028) 
receiving educ./train. 0.047 (0.079) 0.050 (0.090) 
PC not found -0.226 (0.066) -0.298 (0.079) 
on the job search -0.118 (0.088) -0.124 (0.102) 
seasonal job 0.369 (0.063) 0.412 (0.076) 
agriculture -0.580 (0.100) -0.633 (0.115) 
man ufact uring -0.288 (0.072) -0.330 (0.084) 
construction -0.578 (0.082) -0.650 (0.096) 
trade -0.167 (0.067) -0.196 (0.079) 
finance -0.048 (0.102) -0.061 (0.119) 
cohort 1988:4 -0.189 (0.074) -0.264 (0.091) 
cohort 1990:2 -0.714 (0.076) -0.856 (0.097) 
cohort 1991:4 -0.659 (0.087) -0.801 (0.110) 
cohort 1993:2 -0.872 (0.110) -1.046 (0.136) 
cohort 1994:4 -0.935 (0.110) -1.122 (0.136) 
unemployment rate 0.467 (0.331) 0.429 (0.381) 
(J2 0.940 (0.259) 
mean log-likelihood ~~.3417 -0.3413 
No. Obs. 18,151 18,151 
Notes. Standard errors in brackets. Reference category: male, not married, with potential 
experience<5 years, no education, working in the public sector, year 1987. Source: EPA. 
Table 5.2: Base-line hazard estimates 
quarters no heterogeneity heterogeneity 
1 0.177 (0.032) 0.216 (0.046) 
2 0.136 (0.026) 0.182 (0.041) 
3 0.134 (0.026) 0.187 (0.044) 
4 0.162 (0.032) 0.237 (0.058) 
5 0.168 (0.036) 0.265 (0.070) 
6 0.134 (0.033) 0.231 (0.069) 
7 0.201 (0.044) 0.298 (0.072) 
8 0.125 (0.031) 0.186 (0.054) 
9 0.125 (0.034) 0.198 (0.063) 
10 0.093 (0.027) 0.166 (0.058) 
11 0.228 (0.048) 0.311 (0.077) 
12 0.129 (0.033) 0.198 (0.063) 
13 0.127 (0.034) 0.186 (0.056) 
14 and over 0.061 (0.02)) 0.091 (0.033) 
Notes. Standard errors in brackets. Source: EPA. 
coinciding with the maximum allowed duration of fixed-term contracts. 
The control of unobserved heterogeneity in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.2 scales up the 
estimated hazard steps, and this effect is more pronounced at higher durations, as one 
would expect. Nevertheless, the whole picture delivers the same kind of information of 
columns 1 and 2: we note a spike in the hazard at duration 3 years, and a slightly smaller 
spike at duration 2 years. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the determinants of the renewal of fixed-term contracts 
into permanent contracts in Spain. This analysis was motivated by the observation that 
the massive introduction of fixed-term contracts has mainly increased the flexibility of the 
labour market "at the margin", leaving the core of permanent contracts unaffected, and 
has not reduced the Spanish unemployment rate. 
The analysis \vas led in the context of a duration model for temporary employment, 
with flexible duration dependence for the exit into permanent employment. Preliminary 
results show that the probability of obtaining a contract conversion is positively affected 
by the human capital level of individuals, and has a spike towards the completion of the 
legal maximum for the duration of fixed-term contracts. 
Interestingly enough, the adoption of fixed-term contracts has increased roughly mono-
tonically during our sample period, and did not seem at all affected by the state of the 
Spanish business cycle. 
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